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Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to promote the
commercialization of inventions that arise from federally funded
research. However, Congress knew there was a potential that private
beneficiaries might misuse the Act. To combat that risk and protect
the public’s interest, Congress included a “march-in” provision. This
gives the government an option to intervene when private actors are
not making reasonable efforts to realize the benefits of a federally
funded invention.
So far, the march-in provision has failed to live up to its potential.
Although the government has received five march-in petitions, it has
never exercised this right. Federal research agencies, interpreting
their march-in right, have relied on a narrow interpretation of the
statute. This narrow interpretation has meant that agencies are only
able to prevent a narrow range of problems. Instead, march-in needs
to be an effective safety valve that prevents misuse of Bayh-Dole
inventions and protects the public interest without undercutting the
overall Bayh-Dole framework.
This Article argues that march-in can be a more effective tool for
combating misuse, if the government makes minor changes to the
process by which it decides whether to march-in. Specifically, the
government should consider the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-
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Dole Act and weigh the public’s interest when making a march-in
decision. Congress should amend the Bayh-Dole Act to establish this
new approach to march-in, and the implementing regulations should
be revised. Furthermore, federal research agencies should develop
official guidance interpreting the march-in provision. Developing
this guidance through a public process will give the U.S. taxpayers an
opportunity to articulate their goals and expectations for federally
funded inventions, while industry interests can ensure that their
needs are addressed in future march-in decisions. The guidance can
serve as a framework for future agency march-in decisions, and signal
to the community circumstances under which a march-in petition
would be successful. This approach will allow the government to
create the safety valve Bayh-Dole needs without disturbing the
successful operation of the Act
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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Abbott Laboratories received a grant from the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”), and the company used these funds to
discover ritonavir. 1 Ritonavir, marketed as Norvir, is a potent
HIV/AIDS therapy from the class of protease inhibitors. 2 Abbott
brought the product to market in 1996, and, by 2003, the average
daily price for Norvir was $1.71. 3 However, in December 2003,
Abbott Laboratories abruptly increased the price 400 percent, to
$8.57. 4 Patients and advocates, frustrated by the price increase, came
to the government seeking relief. 5 They asked the NIH to exercise its
statutory “march-in” right to resolve the access problem caused by
this price-hike. 6
The Bayh-Dole Act gives research institutions, such as universities
or private labs, the ability to retain patent rights for inventions that
arise from federally funded research. 7 Under the Act, the
government also retains the right to “march-in” and issue a license
for the patented technology to another party; the government can
march-in when patent-holders are not making reasonable efforts to
realize the public benefits of a federally funded invention. 8 In the
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1. Susan R. Morrissey, ‘Marching In’ on NIH-Funded Drugs, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS (Sept. 14, 2004), http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/8237/8237
earlygov1.html.
2. Zelalem Temesgen, David Warnke & Mary J. Kasten, Current Status of
Antiretroviral Therapy, 7 EXPERT OPINION PHARMACOTHERAPY 1541, 1546 (2006).
3. In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
4. Carina Marquez, B. Joseph Guglielmo & Jeffrey D. Klausner, Five Years Later:
Re-examining the Financial Burden of Boosting with Norvir, 22 AIDS 2402, 2402
(2008); Ceci Connolly, NIH Declines to Enter AIDS Drug Price Battle, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2004, at A04, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A404302004Aug4.html.
5. KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, REQUEST FOR MARCH-IN ON ABBOTT
PATENTS FOR RITONAVIR ON GROUNDS THAT ABBOTT PRIVATE SECTOR PRICES FOR
RITONAVIR ARE HIGHER IN USA THAN IN OTHER HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES, AND ABBOTT’S
REFUSAL TO LICENSE PATENTS FOR NON-ABBOTT FIXED DOSE COMBINATIONS OF HIV
DRUGS 5 (Oct. 25, 2012) [hereinafter NORVIR PETITION 2012], available at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2012_Oct25_Ritionavir_march_in_complai
nt.pdf.
6. NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 2.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). In 1983, President Reagan extended the reach of the
Bayh-Dole Act to cover all organizations that receive federal research funding.
Originally, the Bayh-Dole Act only applied to universities and small businesses. After
a Presidential memo and Executive Order, agencies revised their regulations to treat
all research organizations equally. See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414
(Apr. 22, 1987); Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1983 BOOK I PUB.
PAPERS 248 (Feb. 18, 1983); National Science Foundation Patent Policy, 45 C.F.R. §
650.2 (2012) (amending NSF regulations to comply with the Presidential directive
ordering that Bayh-Dole apply to all research organizations).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
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case of Norvir, if the government exercised this march-in right it
would allow competitive manufacturing, lower prices, and new
combination HIV/AIDS treatments. 9 Patients have asked for a marchin on the Norvir patent twice; first in 2004 and again in 2012.10 The
agency is currently evaluating the 2012 march-in petition.11
Patients and advocates asking for a march-in characterized Abbott’s
decision as an abusive practice. 12 Norvir is not used as a standalone
treatment, but instead prescribed in conjunction with almost all
other protease inhibitors to enhance their effectiveness.13 Abbott
raised the price of Norvir to preserve the strong position of Kaletra in
the market. 14 Kaletra, another of Abbott’s HIV/AIDS products, is a
combination pill that contains one of the same active ingredients as
Norvir. 15 Abbott had determined that increasing the price of Norvir
would be an effective weapon against Kaletra’s competition. 16 As a
result of the price increase, patients had to choose either an
expensive treatment regimen including Norvir or switch to Kaletra,
regardless of what treatment worked best for the individual patient. 17

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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9. See infra notes 271- 275 and accompanying text.
10. ESSENTIAL INVENTIONS, INC., PETITION TO USE AUTHORITY UNDER BAYH-DOLE
ACT TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO RITONAVIR, SUPPORTED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY
AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES CONTRACT NO. A127220 11 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
NORVIR
PETITION
2004],
available
at
http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/norvir/norvir-29jan04petition.pdf.
11. See NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5.
12. NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 10, at 10-11, 17; Krista Cox, Notes from the
March 18, 2013 NIH Call on the Ritonavir March-In Request, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:47 AM), http://keionline.org/node/1685.
13. Jana Pokorna, Ladislav Machala, Pavlina Rezacova & Jan Konvalinka, Current
and Novel Inhibitors of HIV Protease, 1 VIRUSES 1209, 1216-17 (2009).
14. See John Carreyrou, Inside Abbott’s Tactics to Protect AIDS Drug, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 3, 2007, at A1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116778411362865429.html
(describing the tactics Abbott considered when it wanted to protect Kaletra against
competition, resulting in the Norvir price increase).
15. In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
16. Carreyrou, supra note 14, at A1.
17. See Letter from Michael Weinstein, President, AIDS Healthcare Found., to
Tommy Thompson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (Jan. 28, 2004),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/Michael-Weinstein.pdf (stating that “a
ritonovir-containing [sic] regimen [is] much more expensive, unless Abbott’s Kaletra
is used”); Letter from Lynda Dee, Co-Chair, AIDS Treatment Activists Coal. Drug
Dev. Comm., to Mark L. Rohrbaugh, Dir., Office of Tech. Transfer, Nat’l Insts. of
Health (Feb. 26, 2004), http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/Lynda-Dee.pdf
(describing how “[t]he disparity in the price of Kaletra versus other Norvir-boosted
protease combinations will negatively impact the health and safety of people with
HIV/AIDS . . .”); Letter from Benjamin Young, Org. of Healthcare Providers, to
Tommy Thompson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., and Mark Rohrbaugh,
Dir., Office of Tech. Transfer, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/Benjamin-Young.pdf (noting that the price
increase “will have adverse consequences for the care of patients as doctors and
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Today, U.S. patients cannot access new, effective HIV treatments,
because Abbott refuses to license Norvir. 18
Congress adopted the Bayh-Dole Act to encourage utilization and
commercialization of new inventions by granting private patent rights
in federally funded inventions. 19 Abbott exploited this privilege.
Instead of promoting utilization of and access to Norvir, 20 the
company manipulated the price of the federally funded invention to
control the HIV/AIDS treatment market. 21
Although the government has received five march-in petitions
since Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, it has never exercised this
right. 22 March-in was intended to protect the public interest 23 and

patients will feel pressure to use Kaletra, even when it is not the best treatment for a
patient”).
18. See NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 6 (describing a new
atazanavir/Norvir combination product that is available in developing countries but
not in the U.S.); Jean-Michel Molina et al., Once-daily Atazanavir/Ritonavir Versus

Twice-daily Lopinavir/Ritonavir, Each in Combination with Tenofovir and
Emtricitabine, For Management of Antiretroviral-Naïve HIV-1 Infected Patients: 48
Week Efficacy and Safety Results of the CASTLE Study, 372 LANCET 646, 646-47

Leahy Calls for NIH March-in Against Myriad But Some Patents Not Subject to BayhDole, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/leahy-calls-for-
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nih-march-in-against-myriad-but-some-patents-not-subject-to-bayh-dole/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2013) (providing perspectives from two scholars on why this march-in request
will not be successful, and linking to Leahy’s letter); Donald Zuhn, Senator Leahy
Urges NIH to Use March-In Rights on Myriad BRCA Test, PATENT DOCS (July 17,
2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/07/senator-leahy-urges-nih-touse-march-in-rights-on-myriad-brca-test.html (providing background on the request
and a description of patents in question).
23. E.g., Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public
Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095,
1096 (1999); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 17 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds.,
2010) [hereinafter MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY], available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13001.
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(2008) (describing how the atazanavir/Norvir combination is better than some of
the other protease inhibitor combinations that include Norvir).
19. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 28-29 (1979) (statement of
Sen. Bob Dole); id. at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006) (the purpose and objectives of Bayh-Dole include
promoting utilization of inventions and public availability).
21. See Carreyrou, supra note 14.
22. Meredith Wadman, NIH Asked to Grant Open Licence on HIV Drug,
NATURE
NEWS
BLOG
(Nov.
2,
2012,
22:05
BST),
http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/11/nih-asked-to-grant-open-license-on-hivdrug.html; J. Steven Rutt, Important Update re: Bayh-Dole Law and Policy: Another
“March-In” Petition, CLEANTECH AND NANO BLOG (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.nanocleantechblog.com/2012/10/30/important-update-re-bayh/.
In
July 2013, Senator Patrick Leahy sent a letter to NIH requesting that the agency
consider march-in with respect to Myriad Genetic’s BRCA gene tests. Tony Dutra,
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prevent misuse of federally funded inventions. 24 As the Norvir
experience shows, march-in has not succeeded in achieving these
goals. Abbott continues to charge a high price for a federally funded
technology, and U.S. patients cannot access some of the best available
HIV/AIDS treatment regimens. 25 The high price of Norvir does not
reflect the value of the product; 26 it reflects Abbott’s desire to
maintain power in the market for HIV/AIDS treatment. 27
Furthermore, march-in was intended to be a valuable deterrent
against inventors, universities, and companies misusing Bayh-Dole
inventions. 28 However, since march-in has never been used, its
“deterrent value has been diminished over time.” 29 The march-in
decision process needs to change to stop parties from misusing BayhDole and prevent future misuse. This Article argues that we need an
effective safety valve in the Bayh-Dole Act that prevents misuse of
inventions and protects the public’s interest, without undercutting
the overall framework of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Academics have not paid much attention to the march-in
provision. 30 Many scholars have written about the Bayh-Dole Act,
addressing the development of research tools, 31 the role of
24. See Amy R. Schofield, The Demise of Bayh-Dole Protections Against the
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Abuses of Government-Funded Inventions, 32 J.L. MED. &
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Y K
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Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in
Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001).
31. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Gary Pulsinelli,
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ETHICS 777, 780 (2004) (describing the need to protect the public against certain
harms, quoting a Senate Committee Report that march-in “should be a sufficient
safeguard to protect public welfare,” and citing Senator Russell Long’s concern “that
march-in rights would be ‘ineffective and valueless’ in protecting the American
public against misuse of government-funded inventions”).
25. See sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. The price of Norvir, before an intentional price increase, was $1.71/day. In
re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
27. See Carreyrou, supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., McGarey & Levey, supra note 23, at 1116 (referring to march-in as
“the proverbial Sword of Damocles, suspended over the federally-funded invention
licensing process, its very presence an incentive for parties to resolve privately wouldbe cases of march-in”); Mark L. Rohrbaugh & Brian R. Stanton, Technology Transfer
at the National Institutes of Health, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 35, 43 (Prabuddha Ganguli, Ben Prickril & Rita Khanna eds.,
2009) (stating that march-in “is useful as a deterrent . . . “).
29. David Halperin, The Bayh-Dole Act and March-In Rights, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 17 (2001), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/David-Halperin-Attorney-Counselor.pdf.
30. Select scholarship on the march-in provision includes: McGarey & Levey,
supra note 23; Schofield, supra note 24; John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker,
Reasonable Pricing – A New Twist for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 149 (2005); Peter S. Arno & Michael H.
Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and
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I. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND ITS MARCH-IN PROVISION
U.S. research universities drive the generation of new ideas and
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Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under
the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights:
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217 (2006); Liza S. Vertinsky,
Experimenting with University Innovation Capacity, 62 EMORY L.J. 741 (2013).
33. See, e.g., Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries?
Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2080 (2008).
34. See, e.g., id. at 2079; David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and
Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 101-102 (2001).
35. See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding
to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1439-1443 (2007); Michael Sweeney, Comment,
Correcting Bayh-Dole’s Inefficiencies for the Taxpayer, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 295 (2012); Arno & Davis, supra note 30.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 45 Side A

universities in product development, 32 and the problem of anticommons. 33 Some authors have rejected the idea that Bayh-Dole has
even had a beneficial effect. 34 A few authors have suggested major
changes in the Bayh-Dole framework. 35 This Article, instead, focuses
on public access to products—especially medically or clinically useful
products—and offers a practical solution to the misuse of Bayh-Dole
inventions through the march-in provision.
This Article will explain how, with a shift in focus and minor
amendments to the statute and regulations, march-in can be an
effective tool to prevent misuse of Bayh-Dole inventions. Part I
provides background on the Bayh-Dole Act, the march-in provision,
and how the current approach to march-in is flawed. Part II tells the
story of two recent march-in petitions: a more detailed description of
the Norvir case and a request for march-in on a treatment for Fabry
disease. These stories reveal how beneficiaries of the Bayh-Dole Act
can exploit this benefit in ways that are inconsistent with the Act’s
objectives. This Part also discusses the current landscape of federally
funded biomedical research, and illustrates why the government
needs to fix the march-in problem. Part III proposes a solution to the
current march-in problem. By simply refocusing the march-in
process, the government can achieve better results with greater
public approval and without damaging the underlying Bayh-Dole
framework. Shifting the approach to march-in can be accomplished
through a series of policy, statutory, and regulatory actions. Finally,
Part IV discusses implications of a change to march-in and explains
how this Article’s approach is superior to other recent policy
suggestions.
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innovation. 36 Government sponsored university research led to the
invention of global positioning systems, DNA fingerprinting, fetal
monitoring, and the algorithm for Google searching. 37 Over the past
forty years, federally funded research institutions have invented over
150 new biomedical products or new indications for existing drugs. 38
The Bayh-Dole Act is credited with making these benefits possible.39
In recent years, the U.S. government has spent approximately $140
billion on research and development (“R&D”) annually. 40 The BayhDole Act is the primary statutory foundation for federal technology
transfer, 41 and applies to the research sponsored by all federal
agencies. 42 The Department of Defense, NIH, Department of
Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”),
and the National Science Foundation are the federal agencies that
spend the most on R&D. 43 NIH is the largest funder of biomedical
research in the world. 44 This Part will explain the rationale behind
the Bayh-Dole Act and describe the march-in provision, both its
content and application.

A. The Bayh-Dole Framework
The Bayh-Dole Act was passed in 1980, based on the belief that
granting patent rights on federally funded inventions would motivate
companies to carry these inventions through development. 45 The
purpose of the Act is to promote “utilization of inventions arising
from federally supported research or development,” free
competition, commercialization of inventions, and the public

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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36. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH UNIVS. & THE FUTURE OF AMERICA: TEN
BREAKTHROUGH ACTIONS VITAL TO OUR NATION’S PROSPERITY AND SECURITY 1 (2012),
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13396.
37. Id. at 2-3; Jonathan R. Cole, Can American Research Universities Remain the
Best in the World?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 3, 2010, http://chronicle.com/
article/The-Clouded-Future-of-Ameri/63353/.
38. Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of Public-Sector Research in the Discovery
of Drugs and Vaccines, 364 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 535 (2011).
39. See Innovation’s Golden Goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002,
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653; see also supra notes 37-38.
40. JOHN F. SARGENT JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY 2013 4 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R42410.pdf.
41. McGarey & Levey, supra note 23, at 1097.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 200-211, 301-307 (2006); MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, supra note 23, at 16 (“The Act established a uniform patent policy among
federal agencies funding research . . . “).
43. SARGENT, supra note 40, at 3.
44. About NIH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Jun. 6, 2013),
http://www.nih.gov/about/.
45. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 290.
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availability of products.46
America has a rich tradition of innovation, but in the 1970s,
America’s R&D productivity was increasing at a slower rate than that
of global competitors. 47 Prior to the Act, the government retained
ownership of most inventions. 48 The government would only grant
Companies found this
companies non-exclusive licenses. 49
unattractive, and few products were developed from federally funded
research. 50 At the time, only four percent of government-held
inventions were successfully licensed51 and only five percent of
government-funded inventions were used. 52 Congress blamed the
federal research policy for stifling productivity and withholding
inventions from the American public.53 Seeking to reverse this trend,
Congress leveraged traditional patent law incentives in federal
research policy to “insure that the fruits of American inventive genius
are delivered to the marketplace as quickly as possible. . . .” 54
An important function of patents in U.S. law is the ex post
incentive to innovate. 55 The Bayh-Dole Act employs a simple
mechanism: it allows institutions that receive federal research
funding to retain ownership of patents that emerge from their
The universities, small-businesses, or organizations
work. 56
(“contractors”) that employ federally funded investigators can
leverage these patents and grant licenses to private companies
(“licensees”). 57 The companies that license these inventions will
further develop and commercialize the ultimate products. 58 The
Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to enter into exclusive licenses for
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46. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
47. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 1-2 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Bob Dole).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
55. CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 32-33 (2nd ed., 2011).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
57. Id.; Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the BayhDole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003).
58. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 28-29 (1979) (statement of
Sen. Bob Dole) (noting the benefits of uniform federal patent policy, including
incentivizing private sector product development, creating partnerships that
promote practical implementation of inventions, and promoting utilization of
inventions).
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federally funded inventions. 59 Under some circumstances, this
exclusivity is necessary to motivate companies to bring products to
market. 60
The Bayh-Dole Act has been referred to as “the most inspired piece
of legislation to be enacted in America over the past century.” 61 It
has been applauded for major contributions to the U.S. economy and
it is even credited with providing the foundation for the entire
biotech industry. 62 However, the Act is not free from criticism. 63 For
example, critics argue that the Act requires taxpayers to “double pay”
for products. 64 The U.S. taxpayer supports the research underlying
an invention and then has to pay again to access the product. 65
Furthermore, the Act is criticized on the grounds that patents are not
necessary to achieve commercialization of all federally funded
inventions. 66 Critics are also concerned about the ability of the
public to access Bayh-Dole subject inventions. 67

B. The March-In Provision: Content and Application
Within the Bayh-Dole Act, there are oversight provisions that
authorize the government to intervene on private parties that are
enjoying patent rights. 68 March-in rights are one important way for
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59. Thursby & Thursby, supra note 57, at 1052 (for example, “[e]xclusive
licensing may be needed when inventions require further development before use”).
60. See Thursby & Thursby, supra note 57, at 1052.; see also Richard Jensen &
Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of University Licensing
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6698, 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6698.pdf (noting that “unless universities have the
right to license patentable inventions, many results from federally funded research
would never be transferred to industry”). But see Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at
301 (“It is also unclear whether such exclusive licenses are necessary to further the
Bayh-Dole Act’s goal of promoting commercial product development.”).
61. Innovation’s golden goose, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 39.
62. E.g., Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 2 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 27, 27-29 (2010) (for example, explaining that the Bayh-Dole
Act “played a critical role in rejuvenating the entire U.S. economic system”).
63. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31; Halperin, supra note 29; Pulsinelli,
supra note 31; Michael Sweeney, Correcting Bayh-Dole’s Inefficiencies for the
Taxpayer, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 295 (2012).
64. See Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 410-11 (describing a fundamental argument
against Bayh-Dole—the public paid for the initial research and must pay a second
time to purchase a product from a patent holder). But see WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 15
(2003) (referring to the argument that government should not obtain copyright
protection because the public would pay twice – for the creation and subsequent
purchase – and stating that “[i]f correct, it would mean that government should
never charge a fee for any service”).
65. Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 410-11.
66. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 302.
67. So, supra note 33, at 2081.
68. MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 23, at 52-53.
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the government to step in to promote general welfare and protect the
public interest. 69 The federal agency that funded a Bayh-Dole subject
invention can march-in and require the inventor, assignee, or
licensee to issue a license under certain circumstances. Essentially,
the march-in provision gives the government the right to force a new
license in two circumstances: if it is necessary to achieve practical
application of the invention or if it is necessary to alleviate unmet
health and safety needs. 70 Elsewhere, the statute defines “practical
application” as manufacturing or practicing an invention such that
“the invention is being utilized and that its benefits are . . . available
to the public . . . .” 71 To date, the government has received five
march-in petitions. 72 All five have been directed to the NIH, and at
the time of this Article the fifth one is pending before the Agency. 73
According to Senator Bayh, the intent of the march-in provision “is
to insure that every effort is made to bring a product to market.” 74 In
circumstances where “this is not being done, the funding agency can
‘march-in’ and require” a license be issued to someone else. 75 The
standard quid pro quo of patent law is a government-granted right to
exclude in exchange for invention disclosure. 76 Under the Bayh-Dole
Act, march-in compels an additional layer of the quid pro quo. An
inventor has an affirmative obligation to practice the invention in
exchange for government research funding and patent rights. 77 If a
contractor or licensee is not living up to this responsibility, the
government can revoke the right to exclude. 78 March-in is the
government’s tool to ensure contractors and licensees are living up to

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2006).
Wadman, supra note 22.
Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-In Rights Over
Abbott Laboratories’ Norvir, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 31, 2012, 11:59 PM),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/groups-petition-for-nih-exercise-of-march-inrights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html.
74. Senator Birch Bayh, Statement of Senator Birch Bayh to the National
Institutes of Health 2 (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/
policy/meeting/Senator-Birch-Bayh.pdf.
75. Id. (“When Congress was debating our approach fear was expressed that
some companies might want to license university technologies to suppress them
because they could threaten existing products. Largely to address this fear, we
included the march-in provisions that are the subject of today’s meeting.”)
76. NARD, supra note 55, at 31.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(5) (2006) (the government can require periodic
reporting on utilization efforts of contractors and licensees); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)
(if contractors and licensees are not achieving practical application, the government
can march-in and require a rights holder to issue licenses).
78. 35 U.S.C. § 203.
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their end of the Bayh-Dole bargain.
When making its first four march-in decisions, NIH relied on the
plain statutory text of the march-in provision.79 The agency only
considered whether contractors and licensees were taking effective
steps to achieve practical application of an invention 80 and whether
march-in would alleviate unmet health and safety needs. 81 This rigid
reliance on the text indicates that NIH would only consider these two
factors in deciding whether to march-in. With such a precedent set,
it appears that NIH will be bound to follow a similar analytical
approach for future march-in decisions. 82 If march-in is going to
have practical meaning and operate as an effective deterrent, 83 the
agency must be consistent in its interpretation of the statute. 84
However, relying narrowly on statutory text in this way makes it hard
for the agency to combat all misuses of the Bayh-Dole Act. For
example, if NIH employs this approach for the current petition, it is
unlikely to march-in on the Norvir patent. 85
II. A TALE OF TWO DRUGS
The Introduction briefly described one way in which a company
can misuse a Bayh-Dole invention. This Part further develops the
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79. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, IN THE CASE OF
NORVIR® MANUFACTURED BY ABBOT LABORATORIES, INC. 4-6 (July 29, 2004)
[hereinafter CASE OF NORVIR], available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-InNorvir.pdf. Two major sections of NIH’s 2004 march-in decision addressed
“practical application” and “health or safety needs.” (The agency also mentioned
drug pricing, because of the specific request.) The agency ultimately decided not to
march-in because exercise of rights was not “warranted in this case within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 203.” Id. at 6. See also infra note 81 and accompanying text
(NIH employed a similar approach in all the march-in decisions, and NIH always ties
its ultimate conclusion back to the language and meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 203, 35
U.S.C. § 203(a)(1), or 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2).
82. NIH has used the same basic framework in all four march-in decisions, based
in the explicit language of 35 U.S.C. § 203. See CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79; NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH OFFICE OF THE DIR., DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF PETITION OF
CELLPRO, INC. (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter CellPro], available at http://www.ott.nih.
gov/policy/cellpro-marchin.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH OFFICE OF THE DIR.,
DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF XALATAN® MANUFACTURED BY PFIZER, INC. (Sept. 17,
2004) [hereinafter Xalatan], available at http://www.ott.nih. gov/policy/March-inxalatan.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH OFFICE OF THE DIR., DETERMINATION IN THE CASE
OF FABRAZYME® MANUFACTURED BY GENZYME CORPORATION (Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Fabrazyme], available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/March-In-Fabrazyme.pdf.
83. See McGarey & Levey, supra note 23, at 1116 (describing the potential for
march-in to operate as a deterrent against Bayh-Dole abuses).
84. MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 23, at 52.
85. See CASE OF NORVIR , supra note 79 (based on the same basic facts, NIH
declined to march-in on the Norvir patent in 2004).
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concept of misuse through the story of two actual march-in petitions.
In these stories, a contractor or licensee leveraged its position as the
owner of a federally funded patent for a purpose that is inconsistent
with the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. For the purpose of this
Article, that inconsistent use of a Bayh-Dole invention falls within the
scope of “misuse.” The misuses described here would tend to reduce
utilization of and access to an invention, instead of promoting those
goals.
First, this Part describes the two recent march-in petitions. One is
the Norvir situation introduced earlier. This Part elaborates on the
story underlying the march-in petitions and the NIH response. The
second march-in petition, regarding a treatment for a rare disease,
illustrates how universities can also misuse Bayh-Dole inventions.
This Part concludes by discussing the potential for misuse more
generally—focusing on the misuse of health and medical-related
inventions.

A. Norvir—High Price for the Wrong Reason
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86. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 1. It is unlikely that Abbott would have
pursued this project in the absence of federal funding. Abbott used the money to
recruit a team of scientists to work in the risky area of antiviral drugs to treat HIV.
JOHN ERICKSON, ON THE ROLE OF THE US GOVERNMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORVIR
2 (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/JohnErickson.pdf.
87. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79 at 1; In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust
Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
88. In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (N.D.
Cal. 2008). Norvir is used to “boost” the effectiveness of other drugs. A small dose of
Norvir is used in addition to other protease inhibitors (“PI”); this not only makes the
other PI more effective, but the other PI can be taken at lower doses and it reduces
the rate at which HIV develops resistance to the other drugs. Boosting PIs with
Norvir improves the quality of the overall treatment regimen and makes it possible
for patients to live longer. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In the late 1980s to early 1990s, researchers at Abbott Laboratories
invented and patented ritonavir using federal funds. 86 Ritonavir,
marketed under the name “Norvir,” is a protease inhibitor; protease
inhibitors are a class of drugs used to combat HIV. 87 After Abbott
introduced Norvir onto the market in 1996, it was discovered that
Norvir could “boost” the effectiveness of other protease inhibitors
when the two were used together. 88 Used alone at high doses, Norvir
causes unacceptable side effects. 89 But when it is used in conjunction
with another protease inhibitor, it is effective at lower doses and
improves the overall effectiveness of HIV treatment. 90 Because Norvir
was used at smaller doses, and was only used to boost the effectiveness
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91. Id. This price drop reflects the price in 1996 ($18/day) and the price in 2003
($1.71/day).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. GlaxoSmithKline introduced Lexiva. Bristol-Myers Squibb introduced
Reyataz.
95. Id.
96. NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 10, at 11.
97. In re Abbott, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
98. Id.
99. Carreyrou, supra note 14, at A1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In re Abbott, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Carreyrou, supra note 14, at A11; In re Abbott, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1082;
Karen Gullo, Abbott Tells Jurors Kaletra was ‘Clobbered” by Competitors,
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of other treatments, the price of Norvir dropped from $18 to $1.71
per day.91
In 2000, Abbott introduced Kaletra. 92 Kaletra contains two drugs
in a single pill, ritonavir and another protease inhibitor, lopinavir.93
In 2003, two of Abbott’s competitors introduced new protease
inhibitors to the market. 94 Both of these new drugs are more
effective if they are “boosted” with Norvir; 95 and Norvir was the only
product available for this “boosting.” 96 For at least some patients,
these new protease inhibitors, when boosted with Norvir, were
preferable to Kaletra. 97 As a result, sales of Kaletra dropped. 98
At the time Abbott’s competitors were preparing to introduce new
protease inhibitors, Abbott’s executives were considering how to
protect Kaletra’s market. 99 Abbott executives knew that if Norvir
were less attractive to patients, then the competing protease
inhibitors would also be unattractive. 100 Abbott even considered
removing Norvir from the market or only selling it in a liquid
formulation that tasted like vomit. 101
In December 2003, Abbott increased the wholesale price of Norvir
by 400 percent. 102 At the same time, Abbott kept the price of Kaletra
constant. 103 This had the effect of making Kaletra the least expensive
boosted protease inhibitor on the market, and essentially increasing
the cost of all competitors’ products—because the competing
protease inhibitors are prescribed along with the more expensive
Patients, advocates, insurance companies,
Norvir booster. 104
pharmaceutical companies, and retailers have all sued Abbott over
the price increase, alleging antitrust violations and anticompetitive
behaviors. However, all of those cases have either settled, dropped,
or failed. 105
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Because Abbott received an NIH grant to fund the early
development of Norvir, the agency has the legal authority to march-in
on the invention and issue licenses to other manufacturers. 106 In
2004 and in 2012, interested parties requested a march-in on the
federally funded patents for Norvir. 107 In 2004, petitioners requested
an open license, to allow generic manufacturers to produce ritonavir
while paying a reasonable royalty to Abbott. 108 This license would
have opened the door to cheaper, generic versions of Norvir. 109 NIH
declined to march-in; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had
approved Norvir, Abbott was marketing it, and physicians were
prescribing it. 110 Based on this evidence, NIH concluded that that
march-in was not appropriate 111 because Abbott was satisfying the
“practical application” and “health and safety needs” requirements
taken directly from the statute. 112
By 2012, the average retail price for Norvir in the U.S. was as high
as $12.63. 113 On October 25, 2012, a collection of nonprofit
organizations submitted a similar petition for march-in on the Norvir
patents. 114 These petitioners sought broader policy changes to
address the problem of high-priced drugs on the domestic market. 115
NIH has not announced its decision in response to this march-in
petition.
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BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-28/glaxoseeks-billions-in-aids-drug-monopoly-case-against-abbott.html;
Karen
Gullo
&
Matthew Hirsch, Abbott Settlement in Norvir Lawsuit Approved by Judge (Update
1), BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=acy1SbJAFm00; Kevin Grogan, GSK Lovaza Generic Case
Settled, Mixed Result in Norvir Lawsuit, PHARMATIMES ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/11-03-31/GSK_Lovaza_generic_case_settled
_mixed_result_in_Norvir_lawsuit.aspx (describing that a jury found that Abbott did
not violate antitrust laws, but awarding $3.4 million in favor of GSK because Abbott
breached a license agreement).
106. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 1.
107. Id. at 2; NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 2-3.
108. NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 10, at 2. Petitioners also asked that generic
manufacturers contribute to a fund for AIDS research.
109. Carreyrou, supra note 14.
110. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 5-6.
111. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 6.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
113. NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 5.
114. American Medical Students Association, Knowledge Ecology International,
U.S Public Interest Research Group, and the Universities Allied for Essential
Medicines.
115. NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 2-3. Petitioners also asked NIH to
address a problem that can arise for federally funded inventions that are used
concurrently with other products.
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B. Fabrazyme—University Seeking Revenue During a Shortage
Mt. Sinai School of Medicine owns the patent for the only FDAapproved therapy for Fabry disease. 116 Fabry disease is a rare,
inherited disorder that causes fat to build up in the body’s cells. 117 As
the fat builds up, it causes a range of serious symptoms, and Fabry
disease can cause life-threatening complications in the kidneys, heart,
and brain. 118 Through NIH funding, investigators at Mt. Sinai
invented a form of alpha-galactosidase A—an enzyme replacement
therapy for Fabry disease. 119 Mt. Sinai granted an exclusive license to
Genzyme for this patent so that the company could develop
Fabrazyme, a product to treat Fabry disease.120
Starting in June 2009, Genzyme encountered viral contamination
in the factory where it manufactures Fabrazyme. 121 The factory was
closed for cleaning, resulting in a limited supply of the drug and
forcing Genzyme to ration Fabrazyme. 122 In November 2009, the
drug shortage got worse when Genzyme suffered additional
manufacturing problems; contaminants (including rubber, steel, and
fiber) were found in vials of Fabrazyme coming out of the factory. 123
Some patients suffered heart or kidney problems. 124 There are
allegations that one or more people died because of the drug
shortage. 125 By the middle of 2010, Genzyme was only meeting
approximately thirty percent of the demand for Fabrazyme.126
There is one other enzyme replacement therapy for Fabry disease
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116. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 1, 6. Mt. Sinai’s patent number “relates to the
production of enzymatically active alpha-galactosidase A from a recombinant
mammalian cell line.” Id. at 4.
117. U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Fabry Disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Aug.
22, 2013), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/fabry-disease.
118. Id.
119. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 1, 4.
120. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 1, 6.
121. Genzyme Halts Production of Two Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/business/17drug.html (“Contamination with
a virus called Vesivirus 2117 has disrupted production and the plant will be closed for
cleaning”).
122. Id. (Genzyme indicated that it might have to ration the limited supply of
Fabrazyme, as well as Cerezyme—a treatment for another rare disease).
123. Andrew Pollack, Genzyme Says F.D.A. Will Oversee Its Factory, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/business/25genzyme.html.
124. Id.
125. Ed Silverman, Fabrazyme Shortage Killed My Husband: Widow, PHARMALOT
(Mar. 9, 2012, 9:18 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/03/fabrazyme-shortagekilled-my-husband-widow/.
126. Genzyme Announces Final Terms of FDA Consent Decree, BUS. WIRE, May
24,
2010,
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100524006520/en/GenzymeAnnounces-Final-Terms-FDA-Consent-Decree.
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available globally. Replagal, a different form of alpha-galactosidase A,
is approved for use in forty-five countries, but not the U.S. 127 Shire, a
U.K. company, manufactures Replagal. 128 During the Fabrazyme
shortage, Shire took steps to make Replagal available to U.S.
patients 129 while also satisfying European demand.130
Mt. Sinai has claimed that Shire’s Replagal infringes its patent for
Fabrazyme. In 2003, the Federal Circuit held that Replagal did not
infringe Mt. Sinai’s U.S. patent. 131 However, between 2010 and 2012,
Mt. Sinai pursued patent infringement actions against Shire in
Sweden, Germany, and the U.K.132 Mt. Sinai won the patent
infringement suit in Germany. 133 The university promised not to
enforce an injunction against Shire during the drug shortage, but it
actively pursued these cases during the Fabrazyme shortage.134
127. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 7; Susan Donaldson James, Fabry Disease
Patients Hope for FDA Approval of Drug Replagal, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011),

Recommendations for Fabry Disease During the Shortage of Enzyme Replacement
Therapy (ERT), 102 MOLECULAR GENETICS & METABOLISM 99, 100 (2011).
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131. Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1106 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of Transkaryotic
Therapies (“TKT”), the U.S. sponsor of Replagal, in a patent infringement suit
brought by Genzyme).
132. SHIRE PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 2011 106 (2012), available at
http://ar2011.shire.com/shirear11/uploads/downloads/pdf/Shire_AnnualReport2
011_NotestotheConsolidatedFinancialStatements.pdf .
133. Id. On May 9, 2012, Shire and Mt. Sinai settled all proceedings in
connection with Mt. Sinai’s European Patent. Mt. Sinai granted Shire a nonexclusive license for the sale of Replagal. Shire plc, Quarterly Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; For the Quarterly Period
Ended June 30, 2012 (Form 10-Q) 20 (Aug. 8, 2012), available at
www.shire.com/shireplc/form.secfilings?type=PDF& id=8752725.
134. Shire Pharmaceutical Contracts v. Mount Sinai School of Medicine, [2011]
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http://abcnews.go.com/Health/fabry-disease-patients-hopeful-fda-approval-shiredrug/story?id=14836161.
128. Id.
129. See Genzyme Has Announced a Drug Shortage for Fabrazyme, FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM187056.pd
f (explaining that Replagal was never approved by the FDA for use in the U.S. Fabry
patients in the U.S. were allowed to take Replagal during the shortage either by
participating in clinical trials or through unique emergency and single-patient
mechanisms authorized by FDA); Deena Beasley, Shire Withdraws FDA Application
for Fabry Drug, REUTERS, Mar. 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/03/14/us-shire-replagal-idUSBRE82D1E720120314.
130. See Press Release, European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency
Updates Treatment Recommendations Because of Continued Fabrazyme Shortage
(July
6,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/
document_library/Press_release/2010/07/WC500094245.pdf (advising doctors to
switch Fabrazyme patients to alternative treatments such as Replagal). Before the
shortage, approximately 1,000 patients in Europe were treated with Fabrazyme and
approximately 500 patients received Replagal. Over 680 patients were switched to
Replagal. Gabor E. Linthorst, et al., Expert Opinion on Temporary Treatment
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In 2010, a group of patients with Fabry disease requested that NIH
march-in on Mt. Sinai’s patent. 135 By issuing a license to another
manufacturer, NIH could have, in theory, increased production of
this treatment. In reality, any licensee would have faced an up-hill
battle to acquire FDA approval before manufacturing the product. 136
Fabrazyme is a biological product; and obtaining FDA approval for a
biological product is a lengthy process with several layers. 137
NIH ultimately declined to march-in, because the proceeding
would not address the underlying health needs.138 Issuing a license
to a third party (if one could be identified) would not increase
production of the treatment—at least not in the short-term. 139 At the
time, Genzyme expected to reach full production by early 2011. 140
Therefore, Genzyme would be at full production well before another
company could even enter the market. 141
By the second quarter of 2012, Fabrazyme patients in the U.S. were
able to receive full levels of the drug. 142 Genzyme built a new
manufacturing plant, and the FDA approved it in January 2012. 143 In
March 2012, Genzyme started shipping Fabrazyme from the new
plant. 144
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EWHC 3492 (Pat) (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2011/3492.html (patent litigation was before a London
court in 2011 and 2012); Ed Silverman, Mt. Sinai Struggles with Disputes Over Fabry
Meds, PHARMALOT (Jan. 23, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/
2012/01/mt-sinai-struggles-with-disputes-over-fabry-meds/; Robb Fitt, UK – Shire v.
Mount Sinai, EPLAW PATENT BLOG (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.eplawpatentblog.com
/eplaw/2012/01/uk-shire-v-mount-sinai.html.
135. FABRAZYME, supra note 82.
136. See id. at 5 (describing the process a licensee would have to follow to
manufacture Fabrazyme).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1 (“Based upon the information currently available, NIH has
determined that a march-in proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) is not
warranted at the present time because any licensing plan that might result from such
a proceeding would not, in our judgment, address the problem identified by the
Requestors.”)
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1-2.
141. Id.
142. Elena Berton, Sanofi Starts Shipping Fabrazyme from New Plant, REUTERS,
Mar.1, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/sanofiidUSL5E8E 18I820
120301.
143. Sten Stovall, Genzyme Gets Nod From FDA for Plant, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702037185045771807827831.
html.
144. Chris Reidy, Genzyme: New Framingham Plant Begins Shipping Fabrazyme
Drug, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.boston.com/2012/03/01/
fabrazyme/z5Tjifs0TNv8M2FqFU79rO/story.html.
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C. The Growing Potential for Misuse of Bayh-Dole Inventions
Bayh-Dole is widely considered to be a success, 145 but the
framework can be misused by the private parties who benefit from
the Act. The Norvir and Fabrazyme stories show how companies and
universities can take advantage of the benefits afforded under the
Bayh-Dole framework. 146 Without a mechanism to oppose this
behavior, companies and universities will be able to continue to
misuse federally funded inventions. As the landscape of drug
development evolves to include more public investment, the
potential for misuse will grow.
Bayh-Dole embraces the idea that normal market forces will be
effective in bringing products through development and
commercialization. 147 In the cases of Norvir and Fabrazyme,
government contractors and licensees overstepped this idea,
leveraging their patent rights in ways that run counter the BayhDole’s objectives. Abbott did not build a better mousetrap. Kaletra
was not the best product on the market. 148 Instead of increasing
value for the consumer, Abbott took another tactic to counteract
competition. 149 Abbott tried to limit patient access to the stand-alone
Norvir product. 150 Before the price hike, Norvir cost $1.71 per day. 151
This is probably an accurate reflection of Norvir’s value since this was
the price before Abbott’s intentional intervention in the market. 152
With federal funding and the promise of patent protection, the
opportunity to develop Norvir was appealing enough to Abbott that it
invested in the research. 153 This is what Bayh-Dole envisions.
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145. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Part II.
147. See Norman J. Latker, Statement Before NIH on Essential Inventions Petition
Regarding Norvir (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/
policy/meeting/Norman-J-Latker.pdf (acknowledging that “market forces would do
a far better job of disseminating government sponsored inventions than
bureaucracies ever could”).
148. See supra Part II.A.; In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp.
2d 1080, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (observing that studies showed new protease
inhibitors were more convenient than Kaletra).
149. See supra Part II.A; Carreyrou, supra note 14 (describing tactics Abbott
considered to defeat new competition in the HIV/AIDS treatment market).
150. See supra Part II.A; Carreyrou, supra note 14 (describing Abbott’s decision to
force patients away from Norvir).
151. In re Abbott, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (“But the use of Norvir as a booster,
and not a stand-alone PI, has also meant that the average daily price of Norvir has
plummeted since Norvir was first introduced, because patients need a much smaller
daily dose . . . By 2003, the average price for a daily dose of Norvir was $1.71.”).
152. See id.
153. See Erickson, supra note 86, at 2-3 (describing that federal funding was
important when Abbott decided to develop Norvir).
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Instead, several years later Abbott increased the price, in an effort to
limit patient access and leverage the invention against competitors. 154
In the case of Fabrazyme, during a drug shortage, Mt. Sinai was
setting itself up to extract licenses or halt production of the only
other product for Fabry treatment. 155 Instead of helping to solve a
serious health problem, the university was pursuing patent
infringement suits abroad. 156 The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is
not to increase university revenue. 157 Mt. Sinai issued an exclusive
license to Genzyme, and Fabrazyme reached the market. 158 The only
competitor product, Replagal, does not even infringe Mt. Sinai’s
patent in the U.S. 159 Clearing the market of all potential competitors
was not necessary to incentivize the development of Fabrazyme. Mt.
Sinai did promise it would not enforce patent rights in Europe
during the drug shortage. 160 However, Mt. Sinai was forcing Shire to
focus resources on patent litigation. 161 With the infringement victory,
Mt. Sinai would be able to shut down Replagal production after the
shortage ended if Shire was not willing to pay a licensing fee. 162 Here
again, Mt. Sinai’s actions would tend to reduce patient access to a
federally funded invention, not increase utilization.
Both of these stories reveal misuse of Bayh-Dole inventions even
though neither invention was left sitting on the shelf. The Bayh-Dole
Act’s sponsors were particularly concerned about inventions sitting
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154. See Carreyrou, supra note 14.
155. See Silverman, supra note 134 (explaining that Mt. Sinai could enforce an
injunction in Europe to generate revenue, but will not pursue the injunction because
it would harm patients).
156. SHIRE ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 132, at 106.
157. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 31 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Bob Dole) (citing Bradley Graham, Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1979) (one of the key issues in early debates about the Bayh-Dole
Act was how to prevent universities from receiving windfall profits).
158. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 6-7.
159. Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1106 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
160. Silverman, supra note 134.
161. See SHIRE ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 132 (describing commitments
and contingencies relevant to Shire’s financial statements, including the Replagal
litigation).
162. Silverman, supra note 134. Shire might be deterred from investing in new
infrastructure to treat the global Fabry community, because the investment would be
wasted if Mt. Sinai won an infringement suit and shut down Replagal production.
New manufacturing facilities would be an important component for resolving the
shortage, but if Mt. Sinai enforced its patent rights after the shortage ended, Shire
would not be able to continue using the infrastructure it had just built. See supra
Part II.B; Food and Drug Administration, supra note 129; European Medicines
Agency, supra note 130.
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on the shelf, 163 and the language of the march-in provision is
primarily targeted to protect against contractors and licensees
ignoring an invention. 164 Focusing only on this statutory language,
however, has not gone far enough to prevent or correct all types of
misuse. When denying each prior march-in petition, NIH has looked
for indications that a company is close to or already marketing an
invention. 165 NIH determined that if a product is already on the
market, then a company is not failing to achieve “practical
application” within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 203.166 Similarly, if
the product has FDA approval (or the FDA is reviewing an
application) and/or physicians are prescribing a product, then the
company is not failing to achieve health and safety needs within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 203. 167 The healthcare market,
pharmaceuticals in particular, provides a good illustration of how
Bayh-Dole inventions can be misused even when there is a product
on the market.
The pharmaceutical industry is different from other industries in
many ways. 168 First, a patient may be willing to pay more for a
product that significantly improves health. 169 Health is relatively
fundamental to everything people do, and therefore we value it
highly. 170
Second, patents afford a legal monopoly, but do not generally
afford an economic monopoly. 171 There are usually substitute
products on the market to compete with a patented product, so price
is subject to normal market forces. 172 Pharmaceuticals have been

Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives,
Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomic Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 177-79 (2001).
169. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of Life and the Rise in
Health Spending, 122 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 39, 68 (2007) (showing that the most
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valuable way to spend additional income is on health).
170. See, e.g., id.at 39 (“People value health spending because it allows them to
live longer and to enjoy better lives.”).
171. NARD, supra note 55, at 2; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 22-23
(explaining that intellectual property protection can create “a monopoly, in the
literal sense in which a person has a monopoly of the house he owns,” however it may
also create monopoly in an economic sense because there “may be no good
substitutes for a particular intellectual work.”).
172. NARD, supra note 55, at 2.
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163. Bayh, supra note 74.
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006) (allowing march-in when a contractor is not
taking reasonable steps towards practical application of an invention).
165. NIH has looked at regulatory approvals and marketing activity when deciding
not to march-in. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 4-5.
167. See, e.g., CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 5.
168. F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 98-99 (1993); Arti K. Rai, The
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identified as one area where patents may confer a unique market
power. 173 For one, customers do not have as much incentive to seek
out substitute products since the insurance company bears most of
the cost. 174 In addition, in order to substitute one product for
another, there must be a substitute on the market. A truly innovative
drug will not have a substitute. 175
Third, in healthcare, the consumer/decision-maker is not an
individual; the decision to purchase healthcare products is made
through a more complex system, not an individual. 176 For common
commercial products, the price is generally controlled through the
relationship between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 177 However,
patients, doctors, and health insurance companies all participate in
the decision to purchase a prescription drug. 178 Complicating this
further is the fact that none of these entities possesses perfect
information. 179 Ultimately, the healthcare consumer is not very price
sensitive, because no single party is paying the full price of the
drug. 180 This makes the price of drugs less elastic. 181 Coupled with
strong demand, this can create something closer to monopoly power
for the pharmaceutical company. 182
Patent law is structured so that firms can recoup the costs of
While the
developing and commercializing new products. 183
pharmaceutical industry is highly regulated, and the costs of
173. See Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to
Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789,
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1814 n. 94 (2003).
174. Rai, supra note 168, at 177 n. 14.
175. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-20 (1998),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/
pharm.pdf (“When a breakthrough drug is introduced, by definition it has no close
substitutes on the market.”). This was the case with Norvir and Fabrazyme. Norvir is
the only “booster” on the market and Fabrazyme is the only FDA approved drug for
Fabry disease.
176. Scherer, supra note 168, at 98-99.
177. Jerry Thursby, A Primer on Costs 14-17 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
178. Scherer, supra note 168.
179. See id.; see also Ernst R. Berndt, Pharmaceuticals in U.S. Health Care:
Determinants of Quantity and Price, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 45 (2002) (providing a
detailed description of factors that control the price of pharmaceuticals).
180. See id. at 49-50, 57 (describing how individual patients value a
pharmaceutical product and how low out-of-pocket payments and insurance
coverage can increase consumption); Rai, supra note 168, at 206 (identifying
healthcare consumers as “cost-insensitive”).
181. Scherer, supra note 168, at 99.
182. Scherer, supra note 168, at 99.
183. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1052 (2005).
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development and commercialization are considerable; 184 due to the
unique nature of the healthcare marketplace, companies may be able
to charge an even greater price than would be necessary to justify
R&D investment. 185 Contractors and licensees who benefit from the
Bayh-Dole Act received federal funding to offset the costs of R&D.
Nevertheless, in the healthcare market, the same forces operate so
that companies can still exercise unique market power.
At a time when the public expects government to play a greater
role in delivering new drugs and biomedical products, 186 it is
increasingly important to address misuse of federally funded
inventions. The public is generally dissatisfied with their level of
access to biomedical products. 187 The government is responding.
Drug discovery and development is changing, and both government
and industry would like to see academic investigators (and federal
funding) play a greater role in the development of new drugs. 188 The
government is making targeted investments in drug discovery
research, implementing new funding programs, and exploring novel
research partnerships. 189 If these efforts are successful, we will see
even more federally funded inventions being commercialized and
reaching the clinic. On the other hand, advocates will continue to
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184. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 19-25 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (describing the
rising costs of drug development).
185. See Berndt, supra note 179.
186. See, e.g., SCI. MGMT. REV. BD., REPORT ON TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND
THERAPEUTICS 8 (2010), available at http://smrb.od.nih.gov/documents/reports/
TMAT_122010.pdf (describing recent Congressional actions that “underscore the
expectation of Congress and the American public that NIH is to play a catalytic role
in realizing the promise of translational medicine and advancing human health”).
187. E.g., Cures Acceleration Network, PARKINSON’S ACTION NETWORK (2013),
http://www.parkinsonsaction.org/federal-initiatives/national-institutes-health/curesacceleration-network.
188. See Francis S. Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time is
Right, 3 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 17 (2011) (describing a new Center at NIH
focused on translational science, including drug discovery and development); P.
Vallance, P. Williams & C. Dollery, The Future is Much Closer Collaboration
Between the Pharmaceutical Industry and Academic Medical Centers, 87 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 525, 527 (2010); Lili M. Portilla, Greg Evans,
Benjamin Eng & Terry J. Fadem, Advancing Translational Research Collaborations, 2
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 30, 31-32 (2010); B. Michael Silber, Driving Drug
Discovery: The Fundamental Role of Academic Labs, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 16,
18 & 20 (2010).
189. NIH recently established the National Center for Advancing Translational
Science (NCTAS) with the mission to “enhance the development, testing and
implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics . . . “ About NCATS, NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/about.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2013).
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come to NIH seeking relief when they are dissatisfied with their level
of access to biomedical products that were funded by the agency.190
March-in is supposed to be a safety valve in the Bayh-Dole Act to
prevent against misuse of federally funded inventions.191 Deterring
misuse should promote increased public access and decrease public
frustration. If the public sees good outcomes and does not witness
misuse, they are likely to continue to support Bayh-Dole. 192 If the
public does not support the Bayh-Dole Act, because they are not
seeing government action to produce their expected health and
safety benefits, there is a risk that the public will pressure Congress to
abandon Bayh-Dole altogether. 193 By continuing to deny march-in
petitions, the government is letting an important tool languish, and
runs an increasing risk of disappointing expectant patients with the
structure and implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act. 194
III. REORIENTING THE MARCH-IN DECISION TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE
SAFETY VALVE
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190. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
192. See Halperin, supra note 29, at 16-17.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part II; Wadman, supra note 22. This is not to suggest that marchin is not working solely because it has never been used. It would be possible that it
was never used because it was never needed. See also Raubitschek & Latker, supra
note 30, at 154-55 (quoting Donald R. Dunner, Vice President of the American
Patent Law Association, rejecting the idea that “march-in rights have been available
for 10 years, and they have never been used; ergo, they are a failure”). This Article
suggests a needed fix because we have at least two examples, involving Abbott and
Mt. Sinai, where Bayh-Dole inventions were misused. Moreover, when declining to
march-in, NIH did not explicitly consider the purpose and objectives of the Act.
197. See supra Part II.C.
198. See supra Part I.B.
199. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
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March-in should be the safety valve within the Bayh-Dole
framework that protects the public interest. 195 However, it is not
working; the government has never exercised march-in rights. 196 This
problem will only get worse as NIH focuses on translating more
federally funded research into marketable technology. 197 In making
previous march-in decisions, NIH maintained a rigid focus on
statutory language at 35 U.S.C. § 203. 198 For current and future
march-in decisions, NIH should reorient its decision-making process
to directly reflect the goals of federal research policy as outlined at 35
U.S.C. § 200—utilization, access, collaboration, and discovery. 199 To
achieve this, research funding agencies, the Department of
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Commerce, and Congress should promulgate explicit instructions
where the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act are
considered from the outset of the march-in process.
This Part will explain how a new approach to march-in would work
and how to implement it. First, this Part will explain why two new
questions should be incorporated into the march-in decision. Then
this Part will explain how to implement a shift in march-in decisionmaking, with research funding agencies issuing interpretive
guidance, the Department of Commerce revising relevant
regulations, and Congress amending the Bayh-Dole Act.

A. How the New Approach to March-In Works
Upon receiving a petition, a research funding agency should
consider two additional factors when deciding whether to initiate the
march-in proceeding: (1) are the contractor’s or licensee’s actions
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act; and
(2) would march-in promote or disserve the public’s interest? 200 By
incorporating these two questions into the initial march-in decision,
the government can create the safety valve that Bayh-Dole needs.
This approach to making the march-in decision will incentivize
behaviors that are consistent with the statutory purpose. This section
will explain how and why the march-in process should incorporate
these questions.

1. Are the Contractor’s or Licensee’s Actions Consistent with the
Purpose and Objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act?
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200. The first question refers the agency back to 35 U.S.C. § 200, the purpose and
objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. The second question emphasizes the public
motivation behind the Bayh-Dole Act.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
202. Id.
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Early on in the process, an agency should evaluate the
circumstances of a march-in petition and ask whether the contractor
or licensee is acting in a way consistent with the purpose and
objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. The Bayh-Dole Act clearly states a
purpose and objectives, and these should be used to measure the
appropriateness of contractor and licensee actions. 201 Congress
passed the Act to promote the utilization and commercialization of
federally funded research, foster collaboration between industry and
nonprofit organizations, encourage free competition without limiting
future discovery, and promote public availability of federally funded
inventions. 202 Congress contemplated some level of monopoly prices
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203. To incentivize innovation, traditional patent law allows patent holders and
licensees to charge any price for a product. Patent law is structured so that firms can
recoup the costs of developing and commercializing new products. LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 64, at 379-80.
204. See supra Part II A-B (discussing how the Norvir and Fabrazyme stories show
how companies and universities can misuse Bayh-Dole inventions).
205. MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 23, at 53 (listing
three guidance documents issued by NIH).
206. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,413
(Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/70FR18413.pdf.
207. Id. at 18,415.
208. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed.
Reg. 72,090 (Dec. 23, 1999), available at http://www.ott.nih.gov/pdfs/
64FR72090.pdf.
209. Id. at 72,093.
210. Id.
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and exclusive licenses under the Bayh-Dole Act. 203 However, at a
certain level of price or exclusivity, contractors and licensees go
beyond what is necessary to achieve practical application, and then
are exploiting the Bayh-Dole privilege. 204 This has the effect of
limiting utilization, access, collaboration, and further discovery.
Weighing the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act in the
march-in decision would allow the government to curb this
exploitative behavior.
NIH has issued general guidance to help contractors conform to
the objectives of Bayh-Dole. 205 The agency should use the march-in
mechanism similarly, to encourage contractors and licensees to focus
on the Act’s objectives. The NIH Best Practices for the Licensing of
Genomic Inventions describe how a contractor can craft appropriate
intellectual property and licensing arrangements for genomic
inventions. 206 The Best Practices encourage contractors to balance
the needs of commercialization against the risk that overly restrictive
patenting or unnecessarily exclusive licensing may limit public access
and future research. 207 Similarly, NIH issued principles and
guidelines for Sharing Biomedical Research Resources. 208 This policy
statement addresses appropriate implementation of the Bayh-Dole
Act, 209 describing how to develop patent and licensing strategies for
NIH-funded inventions and encouraging investigators to consider
alternate sharing mechanisms and narrowly tailored licenses.210 NIH
should employ this same vision of the Bayh-Dole Act when making
march-in decisions.
While this might introduce more subjectivity into the march-in
decision, this Article’s proposed approach will allow the government
to combat misuse of Bayh-Dole inventions. It requires the agency to
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evaluate a contractor’s or licensee’s action based on hindsight;
looking back on a contractor’s or licensee’s decisions and deciding
whether, at the time, those decisions aligned with the policies
underlying Bayh-Dole. Product development is challenging, and it
does not proceed along a common, linear path. 211 It is difficult for
anyone, whether the government, a contractor, or a licensee, to
predict when a patent and/or exclusive license is necessary to
encourage innovation. 212 The ultimate price of a product cannot be
perfectly predicted; the price depends on the eventual market for the
product and the product’s actual value. 213 Retrospectively evaluating
the reasonableness of these decisions will be difficult. However, this
Article’s proposed approach will not open up every product
development decision to government investigation and interference.
Courts granting equitable relief have successfully navigated a
similar problem. Traditional equity provides a safety valve to combat
opportunistic behavior. 214 Opportunistic behavior is “done with a
view to securing unintended benefits from the system.” 215 Just like
Bayh-Dole violations, opportunism is identified based on hindsight.216
Historically, courts have been able to identify this behavior and
fashion equitable relief to prevent people profiting from their own
wrongs. 217 Moreover, courts are still able to achieve a requisite level
of certainty in the law. 218 The safety valve theory of equitable relief
emphasizes good faith and notice: 219 when granting equitable relief,
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Research 2.pdf (“These are very complex and iterative processes that can frequently
be a significant bottleneck in drug development.”).
212. See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 72,094 (explaining factors and options a federally funded research institution
should consider when deciding whether to patent and/or license a technology);
Frequently Asked Questions: Licensing, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, http://www.ott.nih.gov/faqs/lic_faq.aspx (last visited Aug. 8,
2013) (describing the criteria NIH uses when considering an exclusive license, and
how an applicant can justify the need for one).
213. See Thursby, supra note 177, at 14-17.
214. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 4-5 (Oct. 22,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf; Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden &
Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 237-38 (2012).
215. Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 214, at 9-10.
216. Id. at 8.
217. Gergen, supra note 214, at 238-40.
218. See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 214, at 2-4; Gergen, supra note
214, at 241.
219. Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 214, at 40-41.
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211. See, e.g., FASTER CURES, CROSSING OVER THE VALLEY OF DEATH 7 (2010),
available
at
http://www.fastercures.org/assets/Uploads/VOD-Translational
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the court considers whether a party is acting in bad faith (or has
unclean hands) 220 and whether a party is on notice that an action
violates the law. 221 If an actor violates the law in bad faith, equitable
relief is appropriate.222 On the other hand, if an actor is in good faith
or did not have notice of a violation, equitable relief is not
appropriate. 223
March-in, as a safety valve to combat misuse of Bayh-Dole
inventions, should follow a similar structure. If a party, in bad faith,
goes beyond what is necessary to promote commercialization then
march-in would be appropriate. Furthermore, the Bayh-Dole Act
provides public notice of the statute’s policy and objectives. 224 A
party may go far beyond what is necessary to promote
commercialization, even in good faith. Once a contractor or licensee
realizes that its actions are defeating commercialization or
availability, it should self-correct. A failure to correct such a problem
would also justify march-in. While reasonable efforts to utilize an
invention may conflict with public access, obvious or bad faith cases
of misuse will be subject to government scrutiny and potential marchin.

2. Would March-In Promote or Disserve the Public’s Interest?
The Bayh-Dole Act was constructed to benefit the public by
growing the economy, improving public access to new technologies,
and reaping the benefits of public investment in research. 225 Similar
to patent law, 226 Bayh-Dole strengthens private rights to promote
these public ends. 227 Where a private actor fails to achieve Bayh-
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220. See id. at 15-16; Gergen, supra note 214, at 212.
221. See Smith, Economic Analysis, supra note 214, at 20; Gergen, supra note 214,
at 239-40.
222. Gergen, supra note 214, at 243. In granting injunctions, courts leave room
for consideration of good faith and bad faith acts in fashioning relief. “If the actor
has violated the law in bad faith, and injunction will most likely issue . . . . [S]omeone
acting in good faith can generally navigate this system, using common sense and
minimal knowledge to avoid disaster from an injunction.” Id.
223. Id. at 238-40.
224. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012). The development of
additional guidance, as suggested later in this Part, would also support this goal of
public notice.
225. The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 29 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bob
Dole) (describing the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act).
226. Patent law is motivated by the potential for public benefits. It provides
incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate. The law confers technology, knowledge,
and economic benefits on society. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 26-31 (3rd
ed. 2009) (describing the benefits of the patent system, and its utilitarian
underpinnings); NARD, supra note 55, at 28-36.
227. As evidenced in the legislative history, Congress’ view was that in the
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Dole’s purpose and objectives, the government should consider what
the consequences of a march-in would be and decide whether a
march-in would serve the public’s interest. If a march-in is likely to
result in a public benefit, then the government should consider
proceeding. However, it is possible that a march-in would disserve
the public—in which case, the government should avoid it. For
example, the government should consider whether march-in would
compromise the availability and quality of healthcare. 228
Courts consider public interest when granting injunctive relief in
This is consistent with recent
patent infringement cases. 229
scholarship on patent remedies, in which authors question the
suitability of using private rights and remedies to achieve the public
ends in patent law. 230 They have suggested that new remedies are
needed to encourage invention and innovation. 231 March-in, as a sort
of “remedy,” destroys a private right in the interest of serving the
public. 232 Drawing on patent law scholarship,233 the government
should take a further step and refocus march-in on public interests
when private rights fail to achieve their intended goal. This can be
accomplished by making public interest explicit in the march-in
decision process.

B. Implementing the New Approach
Congress, the Executive Branch, and research funding agencies

The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 28 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole).
228. Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma: When Patents Conflict
with Public Health, VA. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2007, at 1, 30 (discussing how courts should
implement the public interest factor from eBay v. MercExchange).
229. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (the
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Supreme Court instructed courts to consider public interest as one of four factors
when deciding whether to grant an injunction for patent infringement).
230. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies (Sept. 23,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1932834 (arguing that remedies for patent infringement should be
tailored to promote innovation, rather than making the patentee “whole”). See also
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
733 (2012) (arguing that courts should evaluate the incentives for and access to
innovation when deciding whether to grant an injunction in patent infringement
cases).
231. See Sichelman, supra note 230, at 35; Wasserman, supra note 230, at 737.
232. See supra Part I.B.
233. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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complete absence of private rights and patent protection the public loses out on the
benefits of federally funded research. “By obstructing patent rights and innovations,
the Government increases the factor of uncertainty in an already uncertain area, that
of technology end result. By denying the modicum of protection that the granting of
patent rights for a limited period of time would afford, the Government removes the
incentive that would stimulate the private sector to develop and market inventions.”
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should all take steps to redirect the march-in decision. While
research agencies already have the authority to incorporate the
purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act into march-in
decisions, 234 formally announcing a new march-in approach has
several benefits, including public notice, public input, predictability,
and transparency. Implementing the new approach would involve
issuing interpretive guidance, revising current regulations, and/or
amending the Bayh-Dole Act. The most obvious and high profile way
to accomplish the change is through a statutory amendment.
However, the same goal could be achieved by revising the associated
regulations or issuing additional guidance regarding the march-in
provision. This section will describe how the government should
develop the new guidance, regulations, and statute.

1. Issuing Interpretive Guidance
Research funding agencies should issue guidance elaborating on
this new approach to march-in. Since biomedical technologies are
the focus of this Article, this Part is directed to new NIH guidance.
However, any federal agency that funds research could benefit from a
similar exercise.235 Alternatively, research-funding agencies could
develop a common guidance through, for example, the National
Science and Technology Council’s Committee on Science. 236
A guidance document interpreting the march-in provision and
explaining the agency’s approach to decision-making could – if
implemented as suggested below – serve the two important purposes
of public input and notice. 237 First, the agency should develop the

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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234. Cf. STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 425 (7th ed. 2011) (reproducing a portion of the ABA’s
Black Letter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, indicating that failure to
consider the purpose of a statute is a reason to set aside agency action); see also 37
C.F.R. § 401.6(g) (2012) (after conducting fact-finding, the head of an agency
should consider the policy and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act when deciding
whether or not to march-in).
235. Here again, an agency could issue this guidance, even if Congress and the
Department of Commerce do not revise the statute or regulations. It is an
interpretation of an existing rule, and the guidance would be consistent with the
current statute and regulations.
236. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, CHARTER OF THE COMMITTEE
ON SCIENCE, NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/CoS-Chartersigned-01-31-11.pdf.
237. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (the benefits of the APA’s rule-making procedures include the opportunity for
people to be heard); see also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and
Information Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007) (providing an
overview of the weaknesses and strengths of guidance documents, and discussing
ways to ensure that public input and notice are incorporated into guidance
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guidance through a public process, providing an opportunity for
notice and comment based on a modified version of the
requirements at section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 238
This type of participation ensures that all stakeholders have a public
forum for articulating their goals and concerns regarding marchin. 239 The process is more democratic, and it is a valuable
opportunity for the agency to learn from public suggestions. 240 Since
Bayh-Dole and march-in are both structured to protect the public’s
interest, 241 the guidance development process is an opportunity for
the public to actually voice their interests. Similarly, Bayh-Dole relies
on attracting interested companies to develop federally funded
inventions. 242 These commercial interests would also have a voice in
the guidance development process, and companies can explain what
they need to see from march-in so that federally funded inventions
remain attractive development opportunities.
Second, the guidance would provide notice and certainty. To date,
there has not been a successful march-in petition. 243 This can create

10/28/2013 10:59:23
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documents).
238. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (2006). This guidance would not have to go through
the APA’s informal rulemaking procedures, and it would not be binding on any
party. Rather, it would explain the existing statute and instruct the public on how
NIH intends to reach future march-in decisions. The agency would still exercise
discretion in reaching individual march-in determinations based on the general
statements in the guidance. The guidance, as such, would fall under the
“interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice” exception to APA rulemaking requirements. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b)(3). See American Hospital Assoc. v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (interpretive rules, excepted from the rulemaking requirements of the APA,
are those which “clarify or explain existing law,” instruct, and do not have the full
force of a substantive rule). NIH could develop this guidance through a modified
procedure that provides opportunity for public notice and comment. The agency’s
public process, relying on the principles embodied in APA, could achieve the
benefits of public input without engaging in an overly burdensome process.
239. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 682 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (the benefits of the APA’s rulemaking procedures include the opportunity for
people to be heard). But see Mendelson, supra note 237, at 424-34 (describing
limitations of policy development through guidance documents, especially from the
perspective of regulatory beneficiaries).
240. FTC, 482 F.2d at 682.
241. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012) (one objective of the Bayh-Dole Act is to
“protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions . . . .”);
McGarey & Levey, supra note 23, at 1096 (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act also includes certain
provisions protecting the public interest. One such provision [is] commonly known
as ‘march-in’ . . .”).
242. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearing on S.
414 Before S. Comm. on Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2 (1979) (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh) (Bayh-Dole was passed to reverse the problem that companies did not have
adequate incentives to develop new federally funded inventions).
243. Wadman, supra note 22.
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244. Id. Each of the previous four march-in decisions describe the circumstances
under which an agency will not march-in. The previous decisions do not describe
circumstances under which an agency will march-in. This gives a lower threshold,
but not an upper limit. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Since this Article
argues for a new approach, the lack of precedent will be even more serious.
245. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
246. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh) (observing that without patent rights “there is little incentive for any
company to undertake the risk and expense of trying to develop a new product”).
247. See supra Part III.A.
248. This policy choice is evident from Congress’s decision to rely on patent law.
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 64, at 379-80.
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uncertainty for universities and companies wishing to license an
invention and wondering what the risk of a march-in is. Could it
happen to me?
Under what circumstances?
There is no
244
Right now, since the government has never marchedprecedent.
in, the risk seems quite low. 245 A shift in the march-in approach
would, however, create more uncertainty about the risk. This
proposed guidance would ease uncertainty by informing the
community as to the direction of future march-in decisions.
Contractors and licensees will know what good behavior looks like
and what behaviors to avoid.
The guidance should address four primary aims: (1) reiterate the
purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act and the importance of a strong patent
right; (2) describe how the agency analyzes the “practical application”
and unmet health or safety need provisions; (3) explain that the
agency will scrutinize contractor and licensee actions for consistency
with the purpose of Bayh-Dole; and (4) develop several case studies.
For the Bayh-Dole Act to encourage innovation there needs to be a
strong property right in federally funded inventions. 246 The march-in
guidance should acknowledge this and signal that the new march-in
approach will not threaten the underlying framework of Bayh-Dole.
The new march-in approach should not significantly increase the
number of march-in proceedings, so initiating march-in will still be a
relatively rare occurrence. 247 The agency should also acknowledge
that Congress intended to allow “monopoly prices” and exclusive
licenses because they are sometimes necessary to incentivize
development. 248 By taking a new approach to the march-in decision,
the government will not start second-guessing every drug price or
dictating the terms of every license.
The guidance should then describe the existing statutory march-in
language, focusing on the definition of “practical application” and
unmet health and safety needs. NIH should draw on previous march-
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249. Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part III.A.
251. See, e.g., FABRAZYME, supra note 82 (drug shortage caused by manufacturing
problems, coupled with patent infringement lawsuits); CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 78
(significant price increase).
252. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
253. See, e.g., Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed.
Reg. 18,413, 18,415 (Apr. 11, 2005) (encouraging contractors to balance the needs
for commercialization against the risk that overly restrictive patenting or
unnecessarily exclusive licensing may limit public access and future research);
Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090,
72,096 (Dec. 23, 1999) (encouraging contractors to craft a patent and licensing
strategy for NIH-funded inventions and consider alternate sharing mechanisms and
narrowly tailored licenses).
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in decisions to describe the features and metrics of product
development that might indicate a company is achieving practical
application and satisfying needs. 249
The guidance should also address the new march-in approach,
structured around the two questions presented in Part III.A of this
Article: (1) are the contractor’s or licensee’s actions consistent with
the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act, and (2) would
march-in promote or disserve the public’s interest? 250 Regarding the
first question, march-in petitions result from specific problems of
development or access to technology. 251 Petitioners and the agency
should identify what actions contractors and licensees are taking that
either cause or alleviate identified problems. Then, the agency
should evaluate those actions in comparison to the purpose and
objectives of Bayh-Dole. Are the contractor’s or licensee’s actions
inconsistent with the goals of utilization, commercialization,
collaboration, discovery, and availability? 252 NIH should also draw on
existing guidance documents to describe how contractors and
licensees are expected to balance the sometimes-competing interests
of commercialization, public access, and future research. 253
Regarding the second question, on public interest, the agency
should describe its analytical approach in this guidance document.
Upon receiving a march-in petition, the agency should consider the
likely outcomes if it does or does not march-in and favor the outcome
that promotes public interest.
Finally, the guidance should provide a set of case studies. The
agency should describe some scenarios that would and would not
warrant march-in, and describe how the decision-making criteria
would apply to the hypothetical situations. This is an area where the
agency will benefit from public engagement. These scenarios should
be subject to broad discussion and scrutiny, so that all members of
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the public can clarify their expectations for march-in against concrete
fact patterns.

2. Revising the Regulations
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254. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012).
255. The Department of Commerce is responsible for issuing regulations to
implement the Bayh-Dole Act. 35 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
256. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.6. The bulk of the regulations define the procedures an
agency must follow upon receiving a march-in petition.
257. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(b).
258. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(g).
259. This sentence should be incorporated after the second sentence in this
section of the regulation, which currently reads: “In the absence of any comments
from the contractor within 30 days, the agency may, at its discretion, proceed with
the procedures below.”
260. 35 U.S.C. § 206 (2006).
261. Id.
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The regulations governing the exercise of march-in rights are
codified at title thirty seven of the Code of Federal Regulations. 254 To
implement this Article’s approach to the march-in decision, the
Department of Commerce should revise these regulations. 255
Currently, the regulations give only limited direction to an agency
regarding the substance of a march-in decision. 256 The Department
should reorganize the regulations and reemphasize the factors an
agency weighs when initiating march-in.
Section 401.6(b) explains that an agency can exercise its discretion
when deciding whether to initiate the proceeding. 257 Under current
regulations, it is not until after the agency initiates the march-in
proceeding that the head of the agency considers the policy and
objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. 258 Section 401.6(b) should instruct
agencies to consider the purpose and objectives of the Act and the
public interest at the outset—when deciding whether to initiate
march-in. Waiting until the end of the march-in proceeding is too
late for a consideration of purpose and objectives. 401.6(b) should
be amended by adding the following sentence:
The agency should consider the following when deciding whether
to proceed with a march-in procedure: the circumstances described
at 35 U.S.C. § 203 (a) – (d), the purpose and objectives of the BayhDole Act at 35 U.S.C. § 200, and the public’s interest. 259
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to issue regulations for
the implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 203. 260 This authorization is
broad, and the Secretary would be able to propose this regulatory
amendment without Congressional intervention. 261 However, the
revised regulations would have to go through a public comment
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3. Amending the Bayh-Dole Act
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262. Id.
263. See supra Part I.B.
264. 35 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2006).
265. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act instructs courts to overturn
agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). The court will look for whether the
agency considered “relevant factors” when it decided to act. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). If an agency relied on factors
that Congress did not intend it to, that could be grounds to reject the agency
decision. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider. . .”).
266. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (acknowledging that agency
decisions are arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider. . .”).
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Amending the Bayh-Dole Act is the most definitive way to
announce a shift for march-in. Congress should revise the Act and
instruct agencies, industry, and the public that march-in decisions will
be guided by the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act and the
public’s interest. Congress can accomplish this by simply adding
another subpart to the march-in provision. The new 35 U.S.C. §
203(c) should read: The Federal agency shall make its determination
pursuant to this section to promote the public interest and in
accordance with the purposes and objectives of this Act.
Congressional action to revise the statute would send a clear signal
to agencies and the public that march-in decisions should be guided
by the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. In denying
previous march-in petitions, NIH has focused on statutory text. 263
After this proposed revision, research-funding agencies can continue
to rely on the statutory text, but incorporate Bayh-Dole purpose and
objectives and public interest into the march-in decision.
With this proposed revision, agencies will be confident that their
march-in decisions will stand up to judicial review. If an agency
decided to exercise march-in rights, contractors and licensees would
be able to appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 264
An agency, not wanting the court to overturn its decision, will choose
to rely on statutory factors when making its initial determination. 265
This Article’s proposed amendment makes it clear that Congress
intends agencies to use the “public interest” and the “purpose and
objectives” of the Bayh-Dole Act as factors when making the march-in
decision. 266 With the statutory cover, agencies will be more likely to
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make march-in decisions consistent with this purpose and these
objectives.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW APPROACH
This Article’s proposal provides a practical solution to the problem
that contractors and licensees may misuse Bayh-Dole inventions. If
the government adopts this proposal, it can redirect march-in so that
it is an effective safety valve to protect public interests. Importantly,
this solution will not destabilize the entire Bayh-Dole framework. In
addition to improving the outcome of march-in decisions, there are
other reasons why this new approach to march-in is a preferred policy
solution.
This Part will address the implications of adopting the proposed
march-in decision process.
This Part will first describe two
hypothetical applications of this Article’s proposed march-in
approach, using Norvir and Fabrazyme as case studies. Then, this
Part will explain a common criticism of march-in and how this
Article’s proposal avoids that problem. Finally, this Part shows how
this Article’s proposal is a preferred policy option over previous
suggestions to address shortfalls in the Bayh-Dole Act and march-in.

A. Test Drive: Applying This New Approach to Norvir and Fabrazyme
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Y K
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267. At the time of this draft, NIH had not announced its decision regarding the
most recent march-in petition. The agency was scheduled to come to a decision in
December 2012. John T. Aquino, NIH Exercising “March-In” Rights—Is the Fifth
Time the Charm?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.bna.com/nihexercising-marchin-b17179870773/. If the government applies the same reasoning it
has in the past, including during the 2004 march-in petition, NIH will probably
decline to march-in. See CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79; see also Dennis Crouch &
Jason Rantanen, Should a Patentee with Market Power be Allowed to Charge
Monopoly Prices?: March-In Rights and the NIH, PATENTLYO (Oct. 28, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/should-a-patentee-with-market-powerbe-allowed-to-charge-monopoly-prices-march-in-rights-and-the-nih.html (predicting
that NIH will reject the petition). However, the agency has been deliberating this
request for nearly forty weeks. For previous march-in decisions, the agency has
reached a conclusion in fifteen to thirty-five weeks. This indicates that NIH might be
reconsidering its standard approach. See supra note 81; see also Notes from the
March 18, 2013 NIH Call on the Ritonavir March-In Request, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:47 AM), http://keionline.org/node/1685.
268. Carreyrou, supra note 14.
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Under this Article’s proposed approach to march-in decisions, NIH
can and should decide to initiate march-in proceedings against
Abbott. 267 Regarding the purpose and objectives of Bayh-Dole,
Abbott’s decision to increase prices was driven by a desire to steer
patients toward Kaletra. 268 Abbott wanted to reduce utilization of and
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access to Norvir. 269 This is directly contrary to the objectives of the
Bayh-Dole Act. 270 A march-in on Abbott would signal to the
community that the government will not tolerate this misuse of
federally funded inventions.
Regarding the public’s interest, several manufacturers in other
countries produce generic versions of ritonavir. 271 If NIH proceeds
with a march-in, these generic products could be available to U.S.
patients. 272 It is also likely that brand name competitors would
manufacture ritonavir as a component of new, potential single-pill
combination therapies similar to Kaletra. 273 These combination
products would be easier to use and other companies could adjust
dosing to achieve optimal efficacy. 274 The price of Norvir in the U.S.
would also drop and come closer in line with the price in other
countries (and the U.S. price from 2003) of between $1-2 per day. 275
The situation is more complicated when it comes to a march-in on
Mt. Sinai during the Fabrazyme shortage. Under this Article’s
approach, NIH could have initiated march-in proceedings against Mt.
Sinai. However, that decision may have run counter to the public’s
interest. Regarding the purpose and objectives of Bayh-Dole, Mt.
Sinai was preparing to extract license revenues from a company
during a drug shortage. 276 The purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act does
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269. See id.
270. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
271. See Norvir Petition 2012, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that five companies are
selling generic versions of ritonavir outside the U.S.).
272. FDA has tentatively approved the use of atazanavir/ritonavir combination
tablets. They can be used abroad, through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR). However, because of the U.S. patent on ritonavir, they are not
available domestically. See Richard Klein and Kimberly Struble, Tentative Approval
of Atazanavir Sulfate and Ritonavir Fixed Dose Combination Tablets, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/
ForPatientAdvocates/HIVandAIDSActivities/ucm280673.htm.
273. See NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 10, at 13-14 (noting that Abbott’s price
leverage has reduced incentives for competitors to develop new protease inhibitors
to be used in combination with ritonavir and describing how the increasing demand
for single-pill combinations make them a lucrative product for manufacturers to
develop).
274. See NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 10, at 13-14 (noting that the single-pill
format simplifies treatment and lowers pill counts for patients, and explaining that
varying protease inhibitor types and regimes can reduce side effects and preempt
development of resistance).
275. See In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (2003 price of Norvir was $1.71/day). Competition would drive the
price of Norvir down. This Article does not suggest exactly how competition would
affect the price of protease inhibitors, but it is reasonable to expect that the price in
2003, which is similar to the global price today, is a more accurate reflection of the
product’s value.
276. See supra Part II.B.; Silverman, supra note 134.
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277. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S.
414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 31 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Bob Dole) (citing Bradley Graham, Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation,
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WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1979) (emphasizing that one of the key issues in early debates
about the Bayh-Dole Act was how to prevent universities from receiving windfall
profits).
278. Silverman, supra note 134.
279. FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 2.
280. Id. at 1.
281. Id.
282. While Genzyme did cause an access problem, the company was not misusing
a Bayh-Dole invention. Genzyme simply failed in quality manufacturing. See supra
Part II.B.; FABRAZYME, supra note 82, at 6-7 (describing Genzyme’s production
difficulties).
283. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Richard Lord, Patients Suffering as Maker Rations Drug, PITT. POSTGAZETTE, Jul. 10, 2011, at A-1; Matthew Perrone, FDA Fines Genzyme $175M for
Manufacturing Problems, ASSOC. PRESS, May 24, 2010.
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not include generating revenue for universities. 277 If Mt. Sinai
enforced an injunction against Shire during the shortage, that would
have further limited the global supply of Fabry treatments. 278
At the time of the shortage, no companies were interested in
receiving a license. 279 Regarding the public’s interest, an NIH marchin would not have solved the supply problem for Fabry patients. 280
The march-in would have been little more than a slap on Mt. Sinai’s
wrist—primarily signaling that the government will not tolerate
misuses of Bayh-Dole inventions. This signal, in and of itself, would
benefit the public to the extent it deterred similar acts from
occurring in the future. Nevertheless, the march-in would not have
caused an immediate public health benefit. 281 Furthermore, the
march-in could have had costs. After a march-in, Genzyme would
have lost its exclusive license for Fabrazyme. 282 It was already losing
its position in the global market relative to Shire, as patients in
Europe were switching to Replagal. 283 Without an exclusive license,
and with Replagal gaining strength, Genzyme could have decided to
give up on Fabrazyme and focus resources on a more secure market.
This would have been unlikely, because Genzyme was under
considerable public pressure to resolve the Fabrazyme shortage. 284
But without an exclusive license, manufacturing Fabrazyme might not
be a sufficiently attractive investment.
When considering march-in petitions, NIH should first evaluate
circumstances in light of the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole
Act. If a contractor or licensee is not acting consistent with the
purpose and objectives of the Act, then march-in might be
appropriate. But the agency cannot stop there. As the Fabrazyme
case study illustrates, even when a party is misusing an invention, a
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march-in will not always be in the public interest. NIH must continue
to consult the statutory text of the march-in provision, evaluate the
circumstances in light of the Bayh-Dole’s purpose, consider the likely
outcomes, and weigh the public interest before proceeding with a
march-in.

B. Preserving the Strong Relationship Between Public and Private
Sectors
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285. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE GOVERNMENT’S
RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS 14 (2009)
(describing the “chilling effect” as a disincentive to exercise march-in rights); Kevin
W. McCabe, Note, Implications of the CellPro Determination on Inventions Made
With Federal Assistance: Will the Government Ever Exercise Its March-In Right?, 27
PUB. CONT. L.J. 645, 665-66 (1998) (arguing that the government should not use
march-in because companies would hesitate to enter into research agreements with
federally funded researchers).
286. See generally MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 23,
at 14-27 (describing the growing number of licenses for university technologies, and
a U.S. innovation system that increasingly involves collaboration).
287. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
288. Mary Eberle, Comment, March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public
Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 177 (1999).
289. Supra Part III.A.
290. Eberle, supra note 288, at 177-78.
291. Supra Part III.B.

34033_amp 5-1 Sheet No. 61 Side A

People often argue that even one instance of the government
exercising march-in rights would have a far-reaching, chilling effect
on the relationship between public funding and private industry. 285
However, this Article’s proposed approach will not chill the strong
relationship between universities and industry. For one, Bayh-Dole
has successfully shifted the landscape of product development. 286
The collaborations between industry and academia are growing
closer, and companies are increasingly relying on university
investigators to generate new ideas. 287 Companies will not quickly
abandon the opportunity to acquire cutting edge ideas from federal
funding just because there has been a march-in. 288
Even though this Article’s proposed approach will shift and
broaden the government’s reasoning about march-in, it is not
expected to drastically increase number of march-ins. March-in will
continue to be the exception, not the rule. 289 There are economic
reasons why misuse is unlikely—both companies and universities
stand to benefit from successful product development. 290
Furthermore, companies can turn to the new march-in guidance for
notice of what behavior is likely to constitute misuse. 291 This Article
acknowledges that, for Bayh-Dole to work, contractors and licensees
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must enjoy a strong patent right in federally funded inventions. 292
The Article’s proposal will combat misuse, but not open the door to
numerous march-in proceedings. 293

C. Improvement Over Other Proposed Solutions
Many authors have suggested solutions to resolve perceived
imperfections in the Bayh-Dole framework. Even the most recent
Norvir march-in petition called for broader policy changes. This
Article’s proposal is a preferred policy option for several reasons. For
one, this Article’s approach is a practical solution, suggesting a minor
modification with significant potential to deter misuse. 294
Some authors have debated whether the government should use
march-in as a mechanism to control the price of federally funded
inventions. 295 This price control argument has been advanced in both
academic and policy circles—it has specifically been raised in the
context of the Norvir problem. 296 NIH has historically been reluctant
to use march-in to control the market. 297 The agency’s mission is
focused on advancing knowledge and improving health. 298 NIH’s
view has been that Congress or the Federal Trade Commission is in a
better position to address questions of drug pricing and market
competition. 299 This Article’s proposal allows NIH to prevent Abbott’s
exploitation of the Bayh-Dole privilege without requiring the
research agency to exert control over the market.
Arguments that suggest march-in should be used to control price
are flawed for many reasons. First, if a company knows that the
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292. Supra Part I.A.
293. Supra Part III.A.
294. Several authors have suggested more radical changes to the underlying
federal research policy. See de Larena, supra note 35; Sweeney, supra note 35; Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 31.
295. Compare Arno & Davis, supra note 30 (arguing that march-in authorizes the
government to review drug prices, and exercise march-in rights when prices exceed
what is reasonable), with Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 30 (arguing that there is
no reasonable pricing requirement under the Bayh-Dole Act).
296. See Arno & Davis, supra note 30; Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 30;
NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5. Numerous people and organizations submitted
comments to NIH in the context of the 2004 Norvir march-in request, regarding
pricing considerations. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, PUBLIC MEETING:
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH – BUILDING 50 (May 25, 2004), available at
http://www.ott.nih.gov/policy/meeting/List-of-Speakers.pdf (providing a list of
speakers at the public meeting).
297. CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 5-6 (in NIH’s view, concerns over drug
pricing should be dealt with through legislation and the FTC is the appropriate
agency to address questions about Abbott’s anticompetitive behavior).
298. About NIH: Mission, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm.
299. See CASE OF NORVIR, supra note 79, at 6.
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government will limit pricing decisions, then it is less likely to pursue
a project with high R&D costs. 300 Companies consider R&D costs
along with predicted profits when deciding whether to invest in
future projects. 301 They assume they will be able to set prices based
on the value of a product on the market, and can estimate profits
based on this predicted value. 302 If the government dictates prices,
the company will not be able to predict profits. A company may not
pursue projects that are subject to significant pricing oversight.
Adopting a policy to control prices could have the effect of making
Bayh-Dole inventions unattractive to the private sector.
In October 2012, march-in petitioners specifically requested that
NIH set a ceiling on domestic drug prices when the drug is based on
a federally funded invention.303 The proposed policy would require a
march-in when the price of a drug in the U.S. is higher than the price
in other high-income countries. 304 Under this proposed policy, a
contractor or licensee could avoid march-in by proving that the high
U.S. cost is necessary to recover actual R&D expenditures. 305 This
proposal reflects a misunderstanding of how companies set prices.
For one, companies do not consider sunk costs—R&D costs—when
setting price. 306
Furthermore, U.S. healthcare prices are higher than prices in
other high-income countries for many reasons.307 Because of the
structure of the healthcare market and our strong IP protection, the
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300. David R. Francis, The Effect of Price Controls on Pharmaceutical Research,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/digest/may05/w11114.html
(last visited Aug. 7, 2013) (describing a study showing that cutting pharmaceutical
prices in the U.S. would lead to fewer R&D projects being undertaken).
301. Thursby, supra note 177, at 14-15.
302. See, e.g., Jessica Wapner, A Secret Revealed: Why Drugs Cost What They Do,
PLOS BLOGS (Apr. 20, 2011), http://blogs.plos.org/workinprogress/2011/04/20/asecret-revealed-why-drugs-cost-what-they-do/ (factors in price calculations include:
how many people will buy a drug, how many of them have insurance, how many are
likely to have Medicare or Medicaid, for how long a patient will take the drug, how
much it costs to manufacture, and what the drug treats).
303. NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 16-17.
304. Id. at 17.
305. Id. (quoting the suggested policy provision that “a licensee may rebut the
presumption of unreasonable pricing by providing evidence that its actual risk
adjusted R&D costs would not be recovered, but for the charging of higher prices in
the U.S. market, or other evidence specific to the risk adjusted costs for the licensed
invention”).
306. Thursby, supra note 177, at 16-17 (observing that to maximize profits, a firm
balances marginal costs and marginal revenues. Firms do not consider fixed costs
when setting prices and determining level of output.).
307. Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Why Drugs Cost So Much, TIME
MAGAZINE
(Feb.
2,
2004),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,993223,00.html.
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308. E.g., id.
309. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: AN OVERVIEW OF
APPROACHES TO NEGOTIATE DRUG PRICES USED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND U.S. PRIVATE
PAYERS AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS 1 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07358t.pdf.
310. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. & WORLD TRADE
ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION 159-60 (2013);
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Companies’ Variation of Drug Prices Within
and Among Countries Can Improve Long-Term Social Well-Being, 30 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1539, 1539-40 (2011).
311. William W. Fisher III, When Should we Permit Differential Pricing of
Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
312. Id. at 7-8.
313. See e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. & WORLD
TRADE ORG., supra note 310, at 159 (Box 4.5 describes an example of Novartis
making a lower cost malaria treatment available for public sector use).
314. NORVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 5, at 17.
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U.S. “subsidizes” the costs of pharmaceutical R&D for the whole
world. 308 Other countries allow the national government to negotiate
drug prices, which does not occur at the same level in the U.S. 309
Trying to control the price of some drugs through march-in is a
narrow and unsatisfactory suggestion within a larger ecosystem where
the U.S. must find a way to address escalating health spending.
Finally, price discrimination on the global pharmaceutical market
is generally a positive thing. 310 Companies will sell the same product
at different prices based on demand in different markets. 311
Consumers in poorer markets will not be able to pay for expensive
drugs, so companies will drop prices to reach those markets. 312 Price
discrimination can increase access to medicine, and benefits
communities that need it most. 313 Blocking companies from price
discrimination at the higher-income level could reduce this beneficial
price discrimination at lower-income levels.
This Article’s proposed approach to march-in would solve the
problem of “excessive or unreasonable” U.S. prices without the
If a company sets an excessive or
adverse consequences. 314
unreasonable price, the government would be able to march-in
under the new approach. Charging excessive prices is inconsistent
with the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act. It limits utilization and
availability of the product. By definition, if it is excessive or
unreasonable, then the price is higher than what the company could
achieve under normal market forces—and higher than what should
be necessary to encourage commercialization. Excessive drug prices
are also not in the public interest. Under this Article’s approach, it is
appropriate to march-in when there are excessive prices. However,
there may be circumstances where a company legitimately charges
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high prices or charges more in the U.S. This Article’s approach
would limit unreasonable prices without the government exercising
undue control over price decisions.
CONCLUSION
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The Bayh-Dole Act has been successful in bringing federally
funded inventions to market, and to the consumer. In passing the
Act, Congress took a calculated risk; sometimes inventors,
universities, small businesses, and large companies will not live up to
their end of the bargain. March-in is the safety valve in the Act that
gives the government and the public recourse if private parties
misuse the Bayh-Dole privilege. Based on the current narrow
drafting and interpretation of the march-in provision, it has not been
an effective tool to correct misuse.
A minor modification and reorientation of the march-in decision
process will go a long way in creating an effective safety valve. If
federal research agencies consider the purpose and objectives of the
Act and weigh the public’s interest when considering a march-in, they
will be able to prevent the full range of Bayh-Dole misuses.
NIH can, and should, start marching-in now. Congress should also
act to formally establish this new approach to march-in. The
government can stop Abbott from continuing to manipulate the
HIV/AIDS treatment market. Abbott is restricting access to a
federally funded invention and impeding the development of new,
better treatments. Marching-in would block these actions that are
antithetical to the purpose and objectives of Bayh-Dole and promote
the public’s interest. In doing this, the government will also send a
signal that misuse of inventions will not be tolerated. Bayh-Dole
affords great opportunities, but those opportunities come with
responsibilities—march-in can be the safety valve to ensure
contractors and licensees live up to their responsibility.
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